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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred on the Utah Court of 
Appeals by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This interlocutory appeal is from an order granting 
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, entered by the Honorable 
Joseph I. Dimick, Fourth Circuit Court Judge of the Provo Circuit, 
State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether properly gathered police evidence can be suppressed 
where the defendant claims police interference precluded her from 
securing an independent chemical test as permitted by UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 41-6-44.10(6)? 
II. Whether properly gathered evidence can be suppressed in 
contravention of the clear and plain reading of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
41-6-44.10(6), which clearly states that failure of the accused to 
secure an independent test cannot affect the admissibility of 
police evidence? 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
A reproduction of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 in its entirety 
is set forth in the addendum, pursuant to the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals 24(a)(6) and 24(f). 
In relevant part, the code states: 
(a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have 
a physician of his choice administer a chemical test in 
addition to the test or tests administered at the 
direction of the peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional 
test does not affect admissibility of the results of the 
test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, 
or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test 
or tests administered at the direction of a peace 
officer. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 14, 1989, the Defendant Mary Werner was arrested 
by Provo City police officers for driving under the influence. 
(Transcript at 25) . She was asked to submit to a breath test, 
which she refused, requesting a urine sample instead. She was then 
informed, under Utah's Implied Consent Law, that: one, she might 
lose her driver's license if she did not submit to the test; and 
two, she had the right to obtain an independent test administered 
by a physician of her choice. (Id. at 30) . Consequently, Ms. 
Werner relented and submitted to the Intoxilyzer test. (Id.) The 
Defendant then renewed her demand for a urine sample. (Id.) The 
Defendant was given a urine sample bottle, and a private restroom 
was made available for her use.(Id.) The Defendant then took the 
bottle, and of her own volition secured a sample for analysis. (Id. 
at 26). Upon release, the Defendant took the sample to the Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center for testing. The Hospital refused 
to test the urine sample claiming that the chain of custody was 
disputable. (Id. at 26) . Consequently, at the suppression hearing, 
the Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the Intoxilyzer 
breath test. The trial court found that the Defendant was made 
aware of her right to a physician-administered test, and that the 
police did not act in bad faith to frustrate her right to an 
independent test. (Ruling, Appendix). However, the court held that 
the police's response to the Defendant's request for an individual 
test did not provide the Defendant with a reasonable opportunity 
to exercise that right, which the trial court held amounted to a 
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denial of due process• (Ruling, Appendix)• Consequently, the 
court granted the motion to suppress. The City appeals from that 
decision of the trial court, 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Appellee has failed to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity for an 
independent test. Based on the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding her arrest for driving under the influence, the 
Appellee lacks a factual basis on which to claim that the police 
interfered with her right to an independent test. The facts of 
this case demonstrate that the Appellee was on notice that she was 
to secure her own test, which she failed to do. Furthermore, the 
Appellee knew her rights, and her dereliction in guarding those 
rights is not a sufficient basis for suppression of the City's 
evidence. 
Likewise, the City is not responsible for the acts of a third 
party which acts caused the Appellee's inability to secure her 
independent test. The plain meaning of Utah's implied consent law 
does not allow for the suppression of properly secured evidence, 
where the defendant's inability to secure an independent test is 
the result of conduct outside of the City's control. The law is 
clear on this point, and public policy demands that it be 
implemented as it is written, in order to curb the destructive 
effects of driving under the influence. 
In addition, the Appellee's claim that her inability to secure 
a second test precluded her from presenting evidence material to 
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her case fails, since the Appellee's evidence was not 
constitutionally material. Her evidence did not possess any 
exculpatory evidence before its destruction, consequently, we are 
left to speculate as to its value, and pure speculation does not 
satisfy any constitutional materiality test. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE SUPPRESSION, BY THE CIRCUIT COURT, OF A PROPERLY SECURED 
CHEMICAL TEST, IS IMPROPER AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE 
NEITHER STATUTE, CASE LAW OR THE FACTS AFFORDS A PROPER BASIS 
FOR THE SUPPRESSION. 
The Appellee claims that the Provo City Police interfered with 
her right to a second chemical test under Utah's Implied Consent 
law, therefore denying her a reasonable opportunity to secure an 
independent test. This claim cannot be substantiated either under 
the facts or the law. It is Provo City's contention that the 
responsibility for obtaining a second test rested with the Appellee 
at all times, and the mere fact that a police officer gave her a 
bottle to secure her own test should not render the City's evidence 
inadmissible. Utah's Implied Consent law is clear and plain on its 
face, as it applies to this set of facts. The appellee did not 
secure a second test, and her failure or inability to secure a 
second test cannot affect the admissibility of Provo City's 
evidence. 
A. A Reasonable Opportunity to Secure An Independent Test 
Depends Upon The Facts Of Each Case, And Must Be Shown 
By Clear And Convincing Evidence, Which Has Not Been 
Shown In This Case. 
The Appellee cites several cases where courts have held 
prosecution evidence inadmissible because the alleged violator was 
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denied a reasonable opportunity to obtain a second test. The 
Appellee relies on these cases as a basis for rendering Provo 
City's evidence inadmissible. However, this reliance is misplaced. 
Factually, the cases on which the Appellee bases her argument are 
distinguishable from the case at bar. A brief summation of those 
cases underlines their distinct factual differences: People v. 
Underwood, 153 Mich.App. 598, 396 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1986)(Denial of reasonable opportunity for second test when 
officers convinced accused that second test was "silly and stupid", 
and would show higher blood alcohol level); Fairfax v. Smith, 330 
S.E.2d 290, (S.C. 1985)(Reasonable opportunity to second test 
frustrated where officer, over accused's objection, seized 
independent blood sample and refused to allow hospital to test, but 
sent the sample to police testing facility); State v. Hilditch, 3 6 
Or.App. 497, 584 P.2d 376 (Or. Ct. App. 1978)(Accused returned to 
jail, after hospital refused test until accused could pay; Officer 
knew accused's wife was en route with money when officer returned 
him to jail); State v. Dressier, 433 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. Ct. App. 
1988)(Frustration of reasonable opportunity for independent test 
where officer refused to take accused to hospital of his choice, 
but took accused to another hospital 23 miles distant). The common 
thread running through each of these cases is the high level of 
police interference in the accused's right to a second test. In 
these cases, based on a factual analysis, the evidence was either 
suppressed or admitted, depending on the level of police hindrance 
which was shown to exist. Consequently, in cases such as these, 
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the facts become the key ingredient in determining whether a 
reasonable opportunity for an independent test was frustrated. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, in Bilbrey v. State, 
531 So.2d 27, 30 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), declared that an 
"appellant must demonstrate that, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the police conduct was unreasonable by clear and 
convincing evidence in order to establish a due process violation." 
Therefore, according to this Alabama Court, a factual analysis is 
paramount to determining whether the police have denied an 
accused's right to an independent test. In Bilbrey, the Court 
found no police interference, hence no due process violation, where 
the officer refused to take the accused to a hospital for an 
independent test. There was no clear and convincing evidence that 
due process had been denied. If this "totality of the 
circumstances" test, as used by the Alabama court, is applied to 
the Appellee's situation, Provo City's evidence should not have 
been suppressed. 
The facts, as revealed by the suppression hearing transcript, 
demonstrate that the Appellee was given a reasonable opportunity 
to obtain an independent test. Officer West, one of the arresting 
officers, testified that he, or Corporal Nisson, told the Appellee 
that "we have a urine bottle, we can certainly give that to you and 
you can obtain your own sample, and have it analyzed it [sic] 
wherever you wish." (Transcript at 30) . The Appellee was on notice 
that this was her "own sample" and that she must have it analyzed 
whenever and wherever she choose. From that moment on, the 
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Appellee was responsible to ensure that she followed the proper 
procedure for securing her independent test. Unfortunately, the 
trial judge and Appellee's counsel have massaged the facts in a 
manner at odds with the testimony presented at the suppression 
hearing. According to the trial court's ruling, upon which 
Appellee's counsel relies, the Appellee went into the restroom, 
obtained a urine sample, and then "stopped the vile with other 
materials provided by the police." (Appendix, Ruling, Paragraph 6) . 
This statement implies that the police were more actively involved 
than the actual testimony reveals. Besides the officer's 
testimony, as to the giving of the bottle to the Appellee for her 
own test, the trial court itself queried the Appellee's counsel as 
to the sequence of events. The colloquy between the court and the 
Appellee's counsel is as follows: 
THE COURT: You're saying they gave her a vial— 
MR. PETRO: Yup. 
THE COURT: —let her use it and let her cork it? 
MR. PETRO: No. They just gave her a vial and didnxt 
give her any more instructions than that. 
(Transcript at 27) . This bit of testimony further substantiates 
Provo City's claim that the bottle given to the Appellee was for 
her "own" test. Likewise, this testimony evinces a diminished role 
of the police in this matter. As Officer West testified, the 
Appellee was given the bottle for her "own" test, and the police 
involvement in the process terminated with this act. There was no 
evidence presented indicating the level of interference suggested 
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by the trial court in its ruling. See also State v. Hayes, 700 
P. 2d 959, 962 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) ("Due process requires only that 
the police give a person accused of driving under the influence a 
xreasonable opportunity to attempt to procure a timely sample,* 
through his own efforts and at his own expense."); State v. 
Russell, 704 P.2d 1215 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
1. The Appellee is not an innocent party and is 
presumed to know her rights under the law. 
The Appellee would have this Court believe that she was an 
innocent party, disadvantaged by her reliance on the police. The 
facts tell a different story. The Appellee, after receiving an 
explanation of her Miranda rights, twice requested to speak with 
her attorney, Mr. Petro. (Appendix, DUI Form; Transcript at 50) 
Furthermore, the Appellee was well aware of the law concerning DUI 
arrests, as she immediately, upon request of the officer that she 
take a breath test, requested a urine test. (Appendix, DUI Form). 
These facts illustrate that the Appellee was well aware of her 
rights under the law. If the Appellee was in doubt as to the 
proper procedure to follow, she could have phoned her attorney or 
anyone else for clarification. Consequently, with respect to the 
preservation of breath samples and the concerns of due process, 
Justice 01Conner has stated, that "the failure to employ 
alternative methods of testing blood-alcohol concentrations is of 
no due process concern, both because persons are presumed to know 
their rights under the law and because the existence of tests not 
used in no way affects the fundamental fairness of the conviction 
actually obtained." California v. Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479, 492 
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(1984)(Emphasis added). As the facts show, the Appellee knew her 
rights and should not be able to have the City's evidence 
suppressed on the contrived notion that she was misled. 
B. The Inability Of The Appellee To Secure An Independent 
Test Was The Result of Actions By A Party Independent Of 
The Police And The Appellee. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals, interpreting Oregon's Implied 
Consent law, stated that "xinability' to obtain a test refers to 
the situation where, for some reason independent of the conduct of 
either the arrestee or the police, such as loss of the blood sample 
by the hospital performing the test, an independent chemical 
analysis cannot be obtained." State v. Hilditch. 36 Or.App. 497, 
584 P.2d 376, 377 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). See also State v. Dressier, 
433 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. Ct. App. 1989). This case, now before the 
bar, reflects the perfect example of where independent conduct 
outside of the City's sphere of control has caused the Appellee's 
sample to lose its evidentiary value. The refusal of Utah Valley 
Hospital to examine the Appellee's urine sample squares completely 
with the Oregon Court of Appeal's definition of "inability". The 
hospital, as an independent actor, frustrated the Appellee's chance 
at a second test. Provo City's evidence should not have been 
suppressed under any application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-
44.10(6)(b) (1953). The "inability" of the Appellee to secure an 
independent test does not preclude the prosecution from using 
properly secured evidence against the accused. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-
6-44.10(6)(b). 
It cannot be argued that ruling in Provo City's favor would 
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strike one more arrow from the accused's quiver. This is not the 
case. By overruling the trial court, this court would be affirming 
the proper interpretation of Utah's Implied Consent law. That is, 
when independent parties interfere with an accused's right to a 
second test, it is not a denial of a reasonable opportunity for 
that test. Such a ruling conforms with the proper meaning and 
construction of the statute as passed by the Utah Legislature, 
wherein the legislature declared that the "failure or inability to 
obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the 
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace 
officer . . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(6)(b). Vacating the 
trial court's suppression order would also be a reaffirmation of 
public policy against driving under the influence of intoxicants 
to which this state has committed substantial resources in an 
effort to curb the destructive effects of such criminal conduct. 
C. Due Process Issues Concerning Constitutionally Material 
Evidence Apply Equally to Evidence Either Preserved By 
The Prosecution Or Secured By An Accused. Appellee's 
Evidence, Secured Through Her Own Efforts Is Not 
Constitutionally Material, And Therefore, The City's 
Evidence Should Not Have Been Suppressed. 
Appellee's brief attempts to distinguish California v. 
Trombetta. 467 U.S. 97 (1984) and other cases cited by the City in 
its original brief by categorizing those cases as pertaining only 
to exculpatory evidence preserved by the City. This is an 
incorrect assumption. The Washington Supreme Court in State v. 
Stannard, 742 P.2d 1244 (Wash. 1987), after discussing Trombetta, 
declared that the constitutional materiality standard of Trombetta 
applied equally to evidence secured by the defendant as well as to 
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that preserved by the prosecution. 
Factually, the Stannard case arose out of three different 
cases where the defendants relied on their interpretation of 
Washington's implied consent law. This law, RCW 46.61.506, allows 
the arrestee to secure an independent test from any "qualified 
person". Id. at 1247. Each of the three defendants interpreted 
this wording to mean that the arresting officer could administer 
the second test. In each case the officer refused, and no second 
test was secured by the defendants. Appeals followed from adverse 
rulings as to the defendants' motions to suppress, on the theory 
that the defendants' due process rights had been denied. 
RCW 46.61.506(5) is similar to Utah's statute in that it 
provides that the "failure or inability to obtain an additional 
test by a person shall not preclude the admission of evidence 
relating to the test or tests taken at the direction of a law 
enforcement officer." Stannard, 742 P.2d at 1247. The Court went 
on to explain that the "statutory scheme provides that reasonable 
opportunity by permitting the accused to secure outside tests. " 
Id. at 1248. It was then held that the officers were under no 
statutory duty to give the defendants a second test.Id. 
The Court then addressed the due process issue. The Court 
held that the defendants have the right to material evidence 
preserved for use at trial.Id. However, the Court also explained 
that to merit the due process clause guarantees, the evidence to 
be preserved must meet the standard of materiality as set out in 
Trombetta. In other words, the evidence "must both (1) possess an 
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exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was 
destroyed, and (2) must be of such a nature that the evidence would 
be unobtainable by other reasonably available means." Id. at 1249. 
Citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984); United States 
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Although the Trombetta case dealt 
with constitutionally material evidence to be preserved by the 
prosecution, the Washington Supreme declared that "[t]he principles 
stated in regard to the preservation of evidence for the defense 
of an accused apply equally to the securing of evidence by an 
accused." Finally, the Court held that 
[e]vidence must be shown to be both material and exculpatory 
in order for it to be fundamentally unfair to deny defendant 
the opportunity to present it in his defense. There is no 
showing that any of the defendants were prevented from seeking 
and securing an alternative test as provided under RCW 
46.61.506. Further, it has not been shown that the securing 
of a second breathalyzer test would have been exculpatory. 
Id. at 1249. 
Clearly, the Washington Supreme Court's ruling is plain in 
its meaning. Whether the destroyed evidence was to be preserved 
by the prosecution or secured by the defendant, that evidence must 
meet the constitutional standard of materiality before the loss of 
such evidence can affect due process. In the case at bar, the 
evidence at issue was that to be secured by the Appellee, but the 
issue of constitutional materiality still applies under the holding 
of Stannard. The evidence the Appellee claims was lost must have 
possessed an exculpatory value before its destruction, and must 
have been unobtainable by other reasonable means. Both prongs of 
this test must be satisfied, and if the Appellee fails to satisfy 
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either of the prongs, her evidence cannot be constitutionally 
material. Consequently, if the Appellee's evidence is not 
constitutionally material, the City's evidence cannot be 
suppressed. State v. Stannard, 742 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Wash. 1987); 
California v. Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479, 466-67, (1984). 
The Appellee has failed to satisfy either of the prongs of the 
constitutional materiality test. As to the first of the prongs, 
the apparent exculpatory nature of the evidence before it was 
destroyed, it is extremely unlikely that the Appellee's urine 
sample could have fulfilled this requirement. This reasoning is 
based on the fact that the arresting officer's DUI report form 
reveals that the Appellee failed the field tests administered to 
her, and that she was abusive in her behavior toward the officers. 
(DUI Report Form, Appendix). Her speech, according to the report 
was "slurred, loud & continual" and, according to the officer, she 
had a "strong" odor of alcohol about her. This evidence, coupled 
with the Intoxilizer results of .13, casts a long shadow of doubt 
over any possible exculpatory value of the Appellee's independent 
test. 
1. Evidence which is cumulative, speculative, or has 
little more than a mere possibility of exculpatory 
value, cannot be considered constitutionally 
material. 
The Washington Supreme Court explained that 
evidence which is merely cumulative cannot be material. 
Further, the evidence has to be shown to have been exculpatory 
in order to meet the constitutional standard of materiality. 
At best, whether the results of a second test would be 
exculpatory or incriminating can be no more than speculative 
and, therefore, of questionable assistance to the defendant. 
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Stannard, 742 P.2d 1249. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, 
cumulative or speculative evidence can never be constitutionally 
material. The Utah Court of Appeals arrived at the same 
conclusions in State v. Jimenez, 761 P. 2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . 
In Jimenez
 f the Court was asked to consider whether the erasure of 
a videotape, which supposedly recorded the alleged assault by the 
accused on a police officer, was material to her case. Id. at 577. 
The defendant, after her arrest on a DUI charge, allegedly kicked 
an officer during the booking process. Id. at 578. The defendant 
was charged for this assault. Before trial the videotape, which 
may have recorded the event, was erased, according to established 
procedure under which such tapes are recycled if no specific 
request has been made for their retention. Id. The defendant made 
a motion to suppress on the grounds that the tape was material to 
her defense. The trial court dismissed the charge on the basis 
that the State failed to retain the videotape. The State appealed 
that decision. 
This Court, in addressing the constitutional materiality of 
the defendant's evidence, declared that 
[constitutional materiality requires that there be a showing 
that the suppressed or destroyed evidence is vital to the 
issues of whether the defendant is guilty of the charge and 
whether there is a fundamental unfairness that requires the 
Court to set aside the defendant's conviction. A corollary 
of this proposition is , *The mere possibility that an item 
of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or 
might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not 
establish materiality in the constitutional sense.' 
Jimenez, 761 P.2d at 578-9, citing State v. Nebeker. 657 P. 2d 1359, 
1363 (Utah 1983) (Court's emphasis) . The Court then held that since 
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Jiminez had failed to show that a videotape had been made, or if 
made, whether or not it contained relevant evidence, the trial 
court erred in dismissing the charges. Id. at 579. The Court 
concluded that 
we are left to speculate on whether any * evidence1 was 
destroyed. If evidence was destroyed, its materiality— 
xevidentiary' or *constitutional1—cannot be determined. All 
defendant has is a mere possibility that there was something 
recorded which might have helped her defense. 
Id. Accordingly, mere speculation as to the existence of evidence 
is insufficient to pass muster under the constitutional materiality 
standard. 
Likewise, City's properly secured evidence has been suppressed 
under the guise of pure speculation. The trial court in this 
instance erred in suppressing the City's evidence, just as the 
trial court did in Jimenez by dismissing the charge. The Appellee 
is laboring under a "mere possibility" that her evidence was 
exculpatory, and therefore constitutionally material to her case. 
The facts surrounding the Appellee's arrest do not support her 
contention that an independent test would have produced exculpatory 
evidence. We are left with nothing more than speculation, which 
speculation is insufficient to meet the constitutional standard of 
materiality necessary to require suppression of the City's 
evidence. A suppression order, on what might have been, is an 
unjustifiable ruling and should be overturned by this court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant respectfully 
requests that the Suppression Order of the Fourth Circuit Court be 
vacated. 
Dated this 23 day of November 1990. 
Vernon F. (Rick) Romney 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that ' true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief were served by mailing , U.S. 
Mails, postage prepaid, on this ^ day of November 1990 to the 
following individuals: 
Michael Petro, Attorney for Appellee 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
'pyrstY^ g
 y 
17 
APPENDIX 
R U L I N G 
In this matter this Court is being asked by the Defendant to 
suppress the result of a breath test administered by the police to the 
defendant pursuant to the arrest of the defendant on driving under the 
influence charges• 
Based on the evidence presented by the parties at an evidentary hearing 
on the motion, the Court makes the following findings of fact* 
1. On the fourteenth day of November, 1989 the defendant was 
arrested by the Provo police-and brought to the police department 
where she was requested to submit to a breath test. 
2. At first the defendant declined, saying she had no confidence 
in the breath testing process and asked for a urine test. 
3. The police read to the defendant the provisions of the "implied 
consent law" including her right to an independant test whereupon she 
consented to the breath test, and gave it, all the while advising that she 
also intended to have an independant test. 
4. After the breath test was completed the defendant inquired again 
about the independant test. 
5. The police officer who had custody of the defendant responded by 
handing the defendant a vile and saying to her that he thought she could 
keep a urine sample in the vile and have it tested later. 
6. The defendant took the vile into a restroom, unattended, placed 
a sample of her urine in it and stopped the vile with other materials 
provided by the police. 
7. The vile was not sealed, or marked in any fashion. 
8. The defendant, when released, took the vile to a local hospital 
and requested that they analize it. 
9. The hospital eventually decline to do so, noting in a letter to 
the defendant that the vile had not been sealed, marked and lacked the 
necessary chaine of evidence. 
The defendant does not claim that she did not receive notice of her 
right to an independant test nor is there anything in the evidence from 
which this Court could conclude that the police acted in bad faith or 
intentionally to frustrate an independant test. 
The City, in response to the motion primarily relies on the provision 
of section 41-6-44.1006) (a) and (b) which provides for the independant 
test and there in paragraph (b) reads: "(b) The failure or inability to 
obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the results 
of the test taken at the direction of a peace officer..." 
This Court however rejects the notion that the above cited provisions 
address themselves to wider circumstances than "••.the failure or inability 
(of the defendant) to obtain the additional test...", and is silent with 
respect to what the remedy may be when the failure results, at least in 
part, from police conduct. 
It seems clear that if the failure to obtain an independant test 
does stem from police actions that such failure may well amount to a 
denial of due process and the appropriate sanition or remedy may well 
be the suppression of the result of the governments test notwithstanding 
the statute. 
Therefore the issue becomes one of deciding if the police response to 
the defendant Ts request for an independant test provided a reasonable 
opportunity to effectively exercise that right. 
Most of the cases dealing with these questions have turned on extremely 
different facts, such as whether the police frustrated the test, or gave 
notice of a right to it, or had some duty to provide affirmative assistance ir 
obtaining the test. 
Not so here. In this case the police clearly gave notice of the right, 
followed by a suggestion as to how the defendant might proceed and there 
provided the materials to undertake the effort. 
So the question presented here is more one of if the police do 
undertake to give assistance to procure a test; must it have some reasonable 
chance of success. 
Clearly, the urine sample taken by the defendant could never have 
been admitted into evidence under the rules of evidence. There could never 
have been an adequate foundation laid. 
It is also clear that the police response amounted to giving advice which 
the defendant followed. 
After considering all of the above this Court finds that the police did 
not provide a reasonable opportunity to the defendant to effectively exercise 
her right to an independant test and that such conduct did act to deny the 
defendant due process of law. 
Accordingly the defendants motion to suppress is granted. 
Dated: 
INTOXILYZER 
OPERATIONAL CHECKLIST - 0 (ASA) 
B J E C T — M ^ ' x ^ u^fp^^^ DATE U>IH> y«t TIME Ql°'\_ 
STRUMENT # ^N-ooiiao LOCATION F^*^ f O 
1 1. POWER SWITCH ON, READY LIGHT ON. 
f' 2. CONNECT BREATH TUBE TO PUMP TUBE, INSERT TEST RECORD 
CARD. 
y 3. PRESS ADVANCE, WAIT FOR LIGHT 2. 
i 4. PRESS ADVANCE, WAIT FOR LIGHT 3. 
«f 5. DISCONNECT PUMP TUBE FROM BREATH TUBE, EXTEND BREATH 
TUBE AND INSERT MOUTHPIECE. - I M E BREATH SAUELE. 
(NOTE TIME) LIGHT 4 WILL COME ON AFTER SAMPLE IS 
TAKEN. 
6. REMOVE MOUTHPIECE, HOUSE BREATH TUBE AND CONNECT TO 
PUMP TUBE, PRESS ADVANCE WAIT FOR LIGHT 5. REMOVE TEST 
RECORD CARD. 
POWER SWITCH OFF. 
HPT—18 (P 418) 
10/86 
TEST RECORD CARD FOR THE 
INTOXILYZER* INSTRUMENT-4011 MODELS 
GRAMS ALCOHOL PER 
210 LITRES BREATH 
•0 0 
#1 
j ) I I 
INSTRUMENT PRINT CODE 
A —AIR BLANK 
B — BREATH 
C — CALIBRATOR (Simulator) 
OBSERVED SUBJECT 
FOR REQUIRED OBSERVATION 
PERIOD AND FOLLOWED 
CHECK LIST 
OPERATORS INITIAL 
^Vo.^.fO 
INSTRUMENT LOCATION 
^ 1 ^ 0 0 1 ( 3 0 
INSTRUMENT SERIAL NUMBER 
DATE 
Q<M3> 
TIME FIRST OBSERVED 
QLoA 
TIME TEST 8TABTE0 
OPfHATOn 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND / OR REMARKS 
=> I 
^ r 
f^\C <3. A . s t , om 
, 1 3 ^ 
U l A i l U N IMU 
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DUI REPORT FORM 
I. CASE IDENTIFICATION: ^ •
 it .. . 
Date /A / f f f i Hay 7 7 ^ . Ardent Ah- Case # Wo9s"f! Time Prepared ^ « > 
Subject's Name ^ v C- & W a r Address foft /tan^c 4 ; * . , , 4z, Q^o 
Place of Pmpinymot(t / / 7 / t / m / L / Address _ZZ . 
/&*<Z- Work Telephone Number 6k Home Teiepnone NumDer /vv*<— wor* leiepnone wumoer ^ ^ ^ -
Dj0.a fi-S-fl Driver License # g ^ V - S B M Time of Arrest- <OMs 
Place nfArmrt 4 g ^ . J o i . . / W frf- Charges fl(T' . • , 
Arresting nffi™* V j /j Lttefr- Assisting Officers 6-ti^M * gjtfr AftSSod. 
Arrestina Aaencv rf*** iAi rr ti g g y 
II. VEHICLE 
Year fife. Color fi£. Make CM- " Model / ^ / g _ Ca/h 3=6 
Ucense # and «** fft AM UT £"•*> Disposition _#jt—ty 6&\ ffltf/fy 
Registered nwnor ^ ^ , - M ^ Address 1 L 
III. WITNESSES: Of passengers, indicate specifically) 
Name i ' Address Tele. # Age/POB 
2. 
a 
& 
IV. ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL: 
The facts establishing the subjectVactual physical control of a motor chicle are: 5- /(ay AltdLt &ki 
V. DRIVING PATTERN: . * X - * * A / / - / / /> 4-
Subject's location when first nhsarvAd eo/fi OK^'TJSJR. JX. ITS**. «Jm7" fffoJ- Lt*JZL . 
The facts observed regarding driving pattern: 4*-*- AofcJ 
VI. PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT: . . . 
PHYSICAL CHABACT^BISTJCS:. 
Odor of alcoholic beverage .Jfo»^r
 v fi • J? 
Balance r+s. X-bj^tseol , U<AlL f u^wU>L n 
Signs or complaints of injury or illness l-jfif i W / AfiftftT f 4^^J^ /AJ*G$0*<. 
Other physical characteristics. 
FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS: (Describe subject's actions) 
1 .SfeJr > / J f» fl^ LMJ t> g ^ l i t u . Very "«****' •&#'** 
* sukfaT.^^tfr^^sT- ,. - - " ^  ^ 
3- gaa^f- fro*. y-Uo L^*Wf-- A^a^- C****M,f: t"'?**^ r^L.fi^ r fr'tr,. 
#. (hd ,4c ^ H W f i W . M*fi ile^ ¥e\ \«~#M*t sty/'*} /a * a ^ ^ • 
•jyAwdes 
Were tests demonstrafad by officer'? ^ _ Subject*g abttity to- fallow instructions / * > / " 
SEARCHES 
A. Vehicle: 
Was subject's vehicle searched? ' ^ , Where? At 
When? Woo Fvirimm flgrfk. a r &I<LA 
t/r 6. <fcf 
**** i Kttt^ 
Person who performed the search 
a Subject: ^ .
 p r . 
Was subject's person'searched? ^ _ J s L _ Where? /A»U» si at! 
When? Pl&> Evidence Found , / / * 
Person who performed the search feffifcr 
CHEMI^M. TESTS: ' 
Mr. dr.Mrs/ wary £- COH^AIeJf , do you understand that you are under arrest for Aftary ^ - UJIU\MCJ\ , oo you understand mat you an 
drivih§-tfnder_the influence of alcoholL(drugs)? Response, [if any) A)o RAJ/SKU^ 
hereby request that you submit to a chemical test tb determine the alcohol (drug) content of your blood. 
' eta*" 
<\3 fr ft 
emical test to c 
request that you take a Lr^f-^ . test. 
(blood-breath-urine) 
fiQ The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was adminis-
r
 tered: 
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence of a blood 
alcohol content or presence of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vehicle may, 
result in suspension or revocation of your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. - -
Wjiat is your response to my request' t taj you subjnit to a chemicaJ test? Resnonsai^- /z*~ ft -— 
t£uhl* J6<r *. fU~~ tec*! aA** i&^ frcaJUjzJvSAs^ /J* a)**. 
Did subject submit to a chemical test? V f " Type of test ' - A ^ C ~ " - 7 
Test Administerediy C//« /T> M&&J Where? ' A ^ > <fcl 
Time: OW 'Results » / S 3 ^ Was subject notified of results?. t 'Us ' 
Serial No. of test machine: 
(if the subject refuses the test, read the following) 
p( The following-admonition was given by me to the subject: 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, however 1 must warn you that if you refuse, your license or 
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited driver's licensa 
After you have taken this test, you will be permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer 
- *-,„• ~,f w i^.r **A,r» avnflnea in iiHr<ifir*n to thp nnp ) have reauested YOU to submit to, so long as it does 
(if the subject claims the right to remain silent or the right to counsel, read the following:) 
D The following admonition was given by me to the subject 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which 
is civil in nature and~separate from the criminal charges. YourTight to remain silent does not give you 
the right to refuseto take the test. You do nor have the right to have counsel during the test procedure. 
Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I will consider that you have refused to take the test. 
I warn you that if you refuse to take the test, your driver's Ircense can be revoked for one year with 
no provision for a limited license. 
XL— CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: 
Was subject advised of/the following rights? VfeJ When ft»/f / / f . 
By Wtojirf ~ y - MrfbJ i Where? fa** W < f c j fdg*^ 
Anything you say can and will be used against you in a*court of law. •6> You have the right to remain silent. 
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being ques-
tioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before 
any questioning, if you wish one. 
If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answer-
ing questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning. 
Were th£ following waiver questions asked?. 
INTERVIEW 
1. Do you understand each of these rights I have, explained, to-you?.. 
Response ^T tskJl /fifa. ftfAo fa-^ , r — 
*-T — ^ - ^ - T — • . . . . . .. 
2. Having theserjflhts in mind, do you wish to talk to us now? . SI A 
Response "^-'m.- 4cIJ/K. m . H ak*f n to// A M& /%7frv 
Were you operating a vehicle?-* / d * . - • -• - - < 
Where were you going? tiffi'd*/*. uou. J w W y . ^ ^ ^ 7 ^ - ^ '/#1*^ ^' 
What street or highway were y**i **> '1~f ^ ' " ^ „ r- ^™^ , j£j "b 
Direction of travel? MM. 11 / * £ > EA*U> dU*U- #• At? ^o/Hrr^au/L, s*jf a, z)eSJ. 
Where did you start fmm??/^Lt^Ae^ tizrMt as/btecf U. T" ^L'J1- A**J* , 
When? -? *fka/c.r Irhr* VA*. ,rUfaf$&i* time is it now? O^d ( Le&*/ a/ rV^Sj 
What iS today's riate? //-W3S 7-R%?f w e e t f ? 17J*J . 
(Actual time A3&? Date. /A /r-fj Day 7*fJ ) 
What city or county are you in now? f/T. 
H- JiMfJ a/t)tMfiS f / * * / r3~ j/r/k-fa What wete you doing during the last three haprs? - faj /r)u<ss / 
Have you been drinking? -J- R/z*s*/s &foj JL-J £t.hrcifj//> ? 77/k^f<fra4: 
What? How much? / 
Where? /ff tfaficUS • 
When did you have your first drink? (•*<*/[ 11 (Je*. 
Are kre.you under the influence 0/ an alcoholic beverage/drugs) now? fef . jL(/t. • > u V JX s/rjofr, 
Hi* rJJ*rfix,fke. . ALt Trie***;,- -M^T T',x. t*^." 
Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or/jrugs of any kind? 
(What kind? Get sample). rM^^Ahr . Tl»>-~/± f lH/:~* ' / 
i  /j    j«  TrA+-cu•ihzerf . issr / 
id you have the last rinse?, .C M,\u£&t/ LJorr .t/t>u irLj/u^ MC. f/ktflt 
UP far - Sort fUvt- r adA.X ,k&A^••"/{';{ *Cs~*S. 
ct was in an accident, ask these questions:) _£ /Ao/fcajec? JU l*/ S>*j l/a/« 
When d .  Iq rinse?
 s jfa/ fr.ftw A( AY ivhrf^y At. _//]&*!/ ^/c^^Jx/A/. 
(If subje JU 
Were you involved in an accident today? -J* * * ** 
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident? 
If so, what? When? 
X1L OTHER OCCURRENCES OR FACTS: 
XIII. ATTACHED DOCUMENTS: 
I have attached the following documents to this report 
1. 9"£bpy of citation/temporary license 
2. D Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit 
3. D Traffic accident report * 
4. D Other documents (specify) 
I hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer anrfthat theanformation contamerf above rn this report form and attached 
documents is true and correct ttrmy knowledge and belief and thaf this report form was prepared in the regular course of my 
duties. It is my belief the subject was in violation ofsection 41-6-44 U £ A at the date, time, anrf place specified in this report. 
ofS»eace O^fcer, A Signature * lp  At 
Law Enforcement Agency A ^ r >4 » 
Date:. 
The original of this form roust.be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to: 
Driver License Division 
4501 South 2*00- West 
P.O. Box 30560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560 
